ADVERSE SELECTION, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE LABOR MARKET

Autores

  • Paulo R. A. Loureiro UCB
  • Adolfo Sachsida Ipea

Palavras-chave:

ADVERSE SELECTION, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION DISCRIMINATION LABOR MARKET

Resumo

The main objective of this study is the application of an adverse selection model to verify the existence of discrimination in a competitive labor market caused by asymmetric information. The most important
result obtained is when a group of workers with different productivities earn the same wage characterizing
discrimination.

Biografia do Autor

Paulo R. A. Loureiro, UCB

Catholic University of Brasilia (UCB).

Adolfo Sachsida, Ipea

Catholic University of Brasilia (UCB) and Institute for Applied Economic Research (Ipea).

Downloads

Publicado

2022-05-26

Como Citar

Loureiro, P. R. A., & Sachsida, A. (2022). ADVERSE SELECTION, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE LABOR MARKET. Planejamento E Políticas Públicas, (30). Recuperado de //www.ipea.gov.br/ppp/index.php/PPP/article/view/35