SMALL AND HIGHLY STYLIZED MODEL OF CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN BRAZIL
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.38116/ppp72art10Palavras-chave:
corruption, public policy, public procurement, system dynamics, BrazilResumo
This research aims to present and analyze a small and highly stylized System Dynamics (SD) model of corruption in Brazil and its potential impacts on fraud in public procurement. It focuses on two key feedback loops: 1) The impact of corruption on the level of economic investments in the country, impacting anti-corruption economic pressure and consequently the effectiveness of the judicial system, and 2) The impact of corruption on income concentration and consequently on the level of active political participation of the population. The SD model was calibrated based on the Brazilian Corruption Perception Index. A scenario analysis was carried out to study the impact of these variables on corruption. Policy implications are discussed. Despite having low internal validity, the model reflects key determinants of the dynamics of corruption as suggested by the literature and might also be useful as an education tool for policymakers.
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