ABSTRACT

Using the theory of competing logics (identity- and norm-based appropriateness and rationally calculated expected consequences) developed by March and Olsen, this paper examines Brazilian motivation for participation in peace operations and how they have changed in recent years. Following the presentation of its theoretical basis, the paper reviews highest-order Brazilian policy documents on foreign and security policy, which are presented with a view to illustrating their incapacity to serve as bases for consistent action in the area, inter alia, of peace operations. It proceeds by illustrating how these vague bases have been translated into past peacekeeping policy. It applies the theoretical approach to the tensions the country’s foreign policy has experienced as it has risen as an emerging power. Finally, there is brief discussion of the peacebuilding model the country has instituted in Haiti, which has outperformed the problems and weaknesses plaguing the political process. The paper closes by offering suggestions for the clarification of Brazilian objectives with regard to peace operations with an eye to the formulation of the country’s first Defence White Paper in 2011.

Keywords: peace operations; Brazil; Haiti; peacebuilding; policy making; decision making process.

RESUMO

Usando a teoria de lógicas concorrentes (identidade e adequação baseado em normas e racionalmente calculada consequências esperadas), desenvolvido por March e Olsen, este trabalho examina a motivação para a participação brasileira em operações de paz e como eles mudaram nos últimos anos. Após a apresentação de suas bases teóricas, o texto revisa os documentos políticas da mais alta ordem brasileira de política externa e de segurança, que são apresentadas com o objetivo de ilustrar a sua incapacidade para servir como base para a ação consistente na área, inter alia, das operações de paz. Ele prossegue, ilustrando como essas bases vagas foram traduzidos para a política de manutenção de paz no passado. Aplica-se a abordagem teórica para às tensões que a política externa do país tem experimentado, uma vez que cresceu como potência emergente. Finalmente, há uma breve discussão sobre o modelo de construção da paz no país instituído no Haiti, que superou os problemas e fraquezas que assola o processo político. O texto fecha, oferecendo sugestões para o esclarecimento dos objetivos do Brasil no que diz respeito às operações de paz com um olho para a formulação do país o primeiro Livro Branco da Defesa em 2011.

Palavras-chave: operações de paz; Brasil; Haiti; peacebuilding; policy making; decision making process.

* This text was submitted for publication on 2 April 2011. The delay in the publication of its English version necessitate two clarifications. First, though it refers to a future Brazilian Defence White Paper and its “recently initiated formulation process”, the White Paper was released in July 2012; it has not been possible to modify the text to take account of this fact. Second, sections 3 and 6 of the text are based on analysis since presented in a further publication by the author: Out of South America to the globe: Brazil’s growing stake in peace operations”. In: KENKEL, Kai Michael. South America and peace operations: coming of Age. London: Routledge, 2013, p. 85-110.

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1 INTRODUCTION
Accompanying the recent rise in the overall theoretical and methodological sophistication of the literature on peace operations, analyses of states’ motivations to contribute troops to such missions have gained in both number and in rigour over the last several years.1 These studies have grown simultaneously with the rise of new troop contributors, often from the category of “emerging powers”. Brazil is one such emerging contributor, having moved in 2004 from sending what had until then been a constant trickle of military observers and liaison officers to providing both the lead contingent and the military force commander of one of the United Nations’ largest missions, the Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). At the nexus of these two developments, this article seeks to bring a more theoretically grounded approach to the study of Brazil’s foreign goals and how these translate into motivations for participation in peace operations.

Though the country has both very clearly defined foreign policy guidelines and highly professional armed forces and diplomatic personnel, the public and political decisionmaking criteria for its participation in peace operations remain subjective, underinstitutionalised and (perhaps intentionally) ill-defined. This stands in sharp contrast to what is increasingly being referred to as a separate Brazilian model of peacebuilding, which increasingly reveals clearly-defined objectives in both the short and long terms, and is implicitly geared towards implementable versions of what have heretofore only appeared as vague declarations of intent in official documents. In this sense, practice leads policy and politics in the cases both of Brazil’s motivations to contribute to UN peace operations, and in the manner of that contribution. This paper argues there is need for considerable consolidation and clarification in Brazilian policy on peace operations (especially on view of the country’s growing profile in this area), and that the appropriate forum for doing so is the recently initiated formulation process for the country’s first Defence White Paper in 2011.

After outlining the theoretical considerations that serve as the framework for its analysis, the paper begins with a review of the highest-order Brazilian policy documents on foreign and security policy, which are presented with a view to illustrating their shortcomings in serving as bases for consistent action in the area, inter alia, of peace operations. It proceeds by illustrating how these vague

bases have been translated into diplomatic statements that are equally inchoate as a basis for concrete policy. Here, other factors from outside foreign policy traditions, particularly the country's rise as an emerging power, are brought to bear as well. The theoretical framework is then used to crystallize out objectives and motivations which can serve as the basis for a clear and implementable policy with regard to peace operations, as developed for and in the Haitian environment.

2 SELFISH ALTRUISM: WHY STATES CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE OPERATIONS

As with other forms of humanitarian intervention, states’ motivations for engaging in peace operations are variegated. Some motivations are internal: a decision to participate may derive from the use of peacekeeping as a means of pursuing a country’s own unilateral interests (although this, to an extent, is anathema to the character of peacekeeping as practiced by the UN); in some cases states view a peacekeeping contribution as conducive to greater international prestige or more inclusions in UN decisionmaking bodies; there may also be genuine altruism mixed in with these motivations on specific occasions. Some motivations, on the other hand, are external: states have been pressured by allies into participating in intervening coalitions, or have altered their position vis-à-vis a specific conflict context as a result of changes in the interpretation of international norms by their leading policy partner. Yet others participate in peace operations for reasons of financial compensation.

Though it is not the most recent, Laura Neack’s 1995 analysis of state’s motivations to participate in PKOs remains seminal in that avails itself of the distinction—novel in, and indicative of, the time of its publishing, steeped in the rise of institutionalism—between what are termed the realist and the idealist motivations for participation. Though analyses of participation have advanced considerably since this time, this distinction remains crucial, and is taken up here; its relevance to the Brazilian case is enhanced further by Neack’s focus on middle powers (a category into which Brazil has recently emerged), and her explicit inclusion of Brazil in the study.

In accordance with specialists on middle powers, Neack situates peacekeeping as a quintessential activity for this category of state, for which international institutions have become the primary vehicle for the pursuit of national interests. She notes the contradiction this creates in terms of separating the rational calculus of interests from altruist dedication to the maintenance of the common good – reified in the global institution – and illustrates how this tension is at its most pointed in the case of multilateral interventions:

2. A frequent example cited in this regard is the Russian military presence in its “near abroad”, particularly the CIS “peacekeeping” sent to accompany UNOMIG.
3. A strong current of analysis among German scholars locates the German government’s motivation for dispatching troops to Bosnia in 1994 to this source.
The origin of UN peace-keeping, then, has an internal contradiction that characterizes it to date. Participation in UN peace-keeping is supposedly an act that transcends narrow national interests, while in no small way peace-keeping has developed as a way for middle powers to demonstrate their power in and importance to world politics.4

Neack then seeks to disaggregate the two motivating factors for peacekeeping participation, which she labels as idealist and realist:

Two competing explanations for state participation in UN peace-keeping can be developed from this contradiction. First, state participation that transcends narrow national interests can be explained from an idealist perspective. Briefly, states will participate in UN peace-keeping out of an obligation to protect the international peace and to preserve international norms and values. States will do so even in the face of conflicting national interests.

The realist explanation of state participation in UN peace-keeping is that states do whatever they can, given their power resources, to protect and preserve their national interests. If national leaders see their states’ interests inexorably linked to the continuation of the international status quo, they will support and defend the status quo. International organizations, particularly the UN, are the main beneficiaries of such support.

For Neack, middle powers are the strongest supporters of peace operations, and have both idealist and realist motivations for doing so. From an idealist standpoint, they “…are the most likely states to protect the international system, and thus more likely to participate in multi-lateral activities such as peace-keeping because of their strong commitment to international peace”.5 However, rational calculus also leads these states to the same conclusion, “because of the aggregate power they can wield. Middle power interests are served by a continuation of the international status quo because in the status quo they have achieved relative affluence and influence…”6

While this is a crucial first step in getting at the roots of states’ decisions to participate, Neack’s two motivations remain weakly differentiated, particularly with respect to the very states on whom she has placed the focus. How does one differentiate in practice between a middle power’s idealist support for structures conducive to international peace as a foreign policy virtue, and its support thereof as a means of maintaining an order from which it benefits? It is not the purpose of Neack’s initial analysis to clarify this point in great detail; this is left to later scholars of the nature of state interests in international institutions.

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5. NEACK, p. 183-184.
In this vein, James March and Johan Olsen’s oft-cited work posits two competing logics which by extension explain state action within institutions (of which participation in peace operations is one form). One is rationalist; the other has been associated with varying success to the constructivist, or at least the normative, school of thought. Rationalist motivations, based on the analysis of relative cost and benefit, are encapsulated in the notion of the “logic of expected consequences”: “[t]hose who see actions as driven by expectations of consequences imagine that human actors choose among alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences for personal or collective objectives, conscious that other actors are doing likewise.” March and Olsen contend that

From this perspective, history is seen as the consequence of the interaction of willful actors and is fully understood when it is related to expectations of its consequences and to the interests (preferences) and resources of the actors. Individual actions are “explained” by identifying consequential reasons for them. Foreign policy is “explained” by providing an interpretation of the outcomes expected from it.

Within the opposing, normatively grounded “logic of appropriateness”, actions are seen as rule-based. Human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations. Action involves evoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation. The pursuit of purpose is associated with identities more than with interests, and with the selection of rules more than with individual rational expectations. Appropriateness need not attend to consequences, but it involves cognitive and ethical dimensions, targets, and aspirations. As a cognitive matter, appropriate action is action that is essential to a particular conception of self. As an ethical matter, appropriate action is action that is virtuous. We “explain” foreign policy as the application of rules associated with particular identities to particular situations.

Succinctly put with regard to decisions related to intervention, “decisions of states to intervene are usually related to two issues: positive cost-and-benefit calculations, and their moral obligations either towards the belligerents or within a generally altruistic behavior.” The lack of clear distinction between these categories is perhaps the most vexing among the number of problems subsequently identified with March and Olsen’s approach. Though there is a temptation, in

8. MARCH and OLSEN, p. 950.
9. MARCH and OLSEN, p. 951.
the interest of methodological parsimony, to construct the logics as totally dis-
tinct, March and Olsen themselves recognize the impossibility of this goal, and
thus work to clarify the relationship between the logics, which they admit are
not mutually exclusive. As a result, political action generally cannot be explained
exclusively in terms of a logic of either consequences or appropriateness. Any par-
ticular action probably involves elements of each. Political actors are constituted
both by their interests, by which they evaluate their expected consequences, and by
the rules embedded in their identities and political institutions. They calculate con-
sequences and follow rules, and the relationship between the two is often subtle.12

Nonetheless, March and Olsen do not retreat from viewing the two logics
as sufficiently separate for operationalization, and offer four possible characteriza-
tions of the interrelationship between the two.13 Ultimately, the most analytically
compelling formulation, especially for those interested in peace operations, is
Kjell Goldmann’s. Goldmann points out the inherent inequality between the two
categories, arguing that while the logic of appropriateness is able to assimilate the
calculation of interest, the logic of consequences in March and Olsen is some-
what of a straw man:

This, at first blush, is simple enough. It turns out, however, that whereas [the con-
sequentialist position] excludes th[at based on expectations], the reverse is not true.
Those on the latter “side,” in contrast to those on the former, are deemed capable
of taking more than one thing into account. They do not link action “exclusively”
to anything: they emphasize identities but do not exclude interests; they do not
deny “the reality of calculations and anticipations of consequences”. In other words,
those who “interpret” action in terms of the “logic of expected consequences” are
simple-minded and unimaginative, whereas those who do it in terms of “the logic
of appropriateness” are open-minded and sophisticated. This may be seen as (rela-
tively) innocent academic salesmanship, but it undermines the idea that we are
dealing with mutually excluding perspectives, theories, or ideal types.14

In this way, the approach based on contending logics is subject to what
might be termed the “normative rationality of action”; actor’s felt identities are
embedded in their calculation of consequences (and interests).15 Goldmann
contends that in essentially taking both preferences and identities as previ-
ously given, even when focussing on identities the approach does not truly
transcend structuralism:16

12. MARCH and OLSEN, p. 952.
15. SENDING, Ole Jacob. Constitution, Choice and Change: Problems with the “Logic of Appropriateness” and its
Sending explicitly references in this regard Thomas RISSE “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics,
16. This point is taken up by SENDING as well.
the “logic of appropriateness” provides for a more complex view of human motivation, because it does not exclude the consideration of consequences whereas the “logic of expected consequences” is taken to “ignore” rules and identities. …[J] ust as the “logic of expected consequences” assumes preferences instead of accounting for them, the “logic of appropriateness” assumes identities. The omission is not complete in either case: reasoning along the lines of the “logic of expected consequences” is often based on a structural theory of interests, just as March and Olsen emphasize the social formation of identities. The parallel is clear, however: while the “logic of expected consequences” essentially leads us to derive actions from given preferences, the “logic of appropriateness” essentially leads us to derive actions from given identities.17

In this sense, in applying contending logics in analysing motivations to participate in peacekeeping, one might begin with the assumption that states are more likely to follow the logic of appropriateness, though one imbued strongly with the drive to follow rationally calculated interests as the situation befits. However, in the case of a practice whose normative basis and practical implementation are driven by international institutions such as the UN, it is clear that a normative concern with identity will limit the expression of exclusively consequence-based action in the ambit of international peacekeeping.18 In other words, a practice historically crafted with an eye to quintessentially Northern elements of identity may not dovetail quite as smoothly with the pursuit of interests of a Southern state without normative tensions and significant adaptations of practice.

3 OFFICIAL BRAZILIAN POLICY ON INTERVENTION AND PEACE OPERATIONS

How, then, does this theoretical lens allow us to elucidate the motivating factors behind Brazilian policy and decision-making on peace operations? For all its abovementioned shortcomings, by disaggregating normative from material policy motivations, the competing-logics approach is particularly helpful with regard to two aspects central to understanding Brazilian peacekeeping policy. These are the normative tension between historical, regionally-bound foreign policy traditions and newly evolving international norms of intervention; and the effects of the country’s fractured and underinstitutionalized decisionmaking process in the area of peace operations.

In its foreign policy orientation, Brazil is very firmly rooted in the Latin American security subculture. Shaped by almost two centuries of a continued interventionist stance by the United States in the hemisphere, this culture has focussed largely on the development of legal protections against American intervention.

17. GOLDMANN, p. 44.
As a result, its highest principle is respect for the norm of non-intervention, an interpretation which has a corollary in the equation of the principle of sovereignty with the inviolability of borders.

Following independence from Portugal and Spain, the newly independent states of South America largely settled their borders by negotiation rather than force, and have adopted a strong preference for negotiation, coupled with the strong repudiation of the use of force in the resolution of disputes. Historically speaking, in global terms Brazil’s perception of its identity was long that of a weak peripheral state in need of the protection of absolute sovereignty against the will of the stronger Northern powers. The normative frameworks of multilateral institutions and international law have long been seen as an essential protection against the vagaries of the power distribution in the international system.

In this sense, the key role of multilateral institutions in the expression of Brazil’s foreign policy identity underscores the commingled nature of normative and material interests within it: sustaining international institutions and their practices are a form of pursuing the national interest, which in turn derives partially from normative feedback from those fora. Tellingly, in its role as the primary architect of Brazilian foreign policy, the Ministry of External Relations, also known as Itamaraty, has a pronounced predilection for the multilateral form and its normative sequelae. By contrast, the Armed Forces, primary designers of the country’s defence policy and primary implementers of its peacekeeping policy, hew to the line, common to almost all military establishments, of placing at the centre of their analysis a primarily material national interest. This has resulted in a nefarious vagueness in both declaratory policy and the specific process with regard to peace operations.

The documents which ground Brazil’s foreign policy conduct strongly illustrate this point. Article 4 of the 1988 Constitution subjects Brazil’s international action to the following principles:

I – national independence;
II – prevalence of human rights;
III – self-determination of the peoples;
IV – non-intervention;
V – equality among the States;

19. Indeed it is the conflict between this predilection, manifested in participation in peace operations, and the absolutist interpretation of sovereignty, manifested in the strict non-intervention norm, that is at the basis of the larger tensions surrounding Brazilian policy on peace operations as the country emerges into a more prominent international role. See KENKEL, Kai Michael, Global Player, or Watching from the Sidelines? The "responsibility to protect": definition and implications for Brazil, Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval, v. 12, p. 6-59, 2008.
VI – defense of peace;
VII – peaceful settlement of conflicts;
VIII – repudiation of terrorism and racism;
IX – cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind;
X – granting of political asylum.  

Beyond its decisive function, what makes this paragraph interesting is that it does not establish a hierarchy between the values in question; in the case of a clash between the values of “defense of peace” or “non-intervention” with “self-determination” or “human rights”, it is explicitly left to politics to decide which precept is to prevail. This “post-modern” aspect of the Brazilian Constitution is both a blessing and a curse; it allows great freedom of interpretation while providing less of a firm guideline in specific situations. Article 4’s precepts could indeed be used as reasoning for Brazil to act in divergent ways during the same crisis, if intervention were deemed an option in attaining, for example, the defence of peace.

As a result, Article 4 attributes a powerful interpretative role to both the Executive and the Legislative. Partially as a result of the stigmas on dealing with military issues resulting from the era of military rule, both branches have largely shied away from taking on this role. There is a general lack of expertise and interest regarding military issues within Parliament, and the executive branch – which indeed has only possessed a civilian Ministry of Defence since 1999 – has yet to lay out policy guidelines truly capable of serving as the basis for implementable policy. This is due to change with the drafting of the country’s first Defence White Paper in late 2011.

A case in point are the two iterations of the National Defence Policy (Política de Defesa Nacional) put forth in 1996 and 2005. The history of the first document is telling: after having been submitted in the form of “Foundations of a [future] National Defence Policy”, during the consultation process the “Foundations of a” was simply removed and the document published in essentially unrevised form as a government document. This is reflected in its vagueness, particularly as regards the complex of issues surrounding peace operations. Consistent in adopting a preference for pacific, non-military approaches to defence (and pervasively referring to the armed forces and diplomacy with largely unquantifiable notions such

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as “expressions of national sovereignty and dignity,”), the document establishes, *inter alia*, three values as defence policy priorities:

e. the fulfilment and maintenance of Brazilian interests abroad;

f. the projection of Brazil within the international community and its better insertion into international decision-making processes; and

g. its contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Committing the country to “the search for the pacific settlement of disputes, with the use of force only as a means of self-defence”, the final guidelines of the 1996 document, with relevance to peace operations, are:

a. active contribution to the building of an international order, based upon the rule of law, which will promote universal and regional peace and the sustainable development of humanity;

b. increasing participation in international decision-making processes;

c. the improvement and increase of Brazil’s negotiating capacity on the international scene;

e. participation in international peacekeeping operations, in accordance with national interests.

The 1996 policy document shows very clearly the overlap between the logics of appropriateness and consequences as expounded by March and Olsen and critiqued by Goldmann and Sending. The policy defines as interests aspects generally associated in the “logics” approach with identity, and subordinates to interests – at home in the logic of consequences – the practice of peacekeeping generally held to be subject to the dictates of norms and identity. This results from the aforementioned Brazilian historical self-identification – now increasingly contested – as a peripheral state whose best chance at achieving influence on the international stage is through a commitment to the multilateral form.

In this sense, it can be said that March and Olsen’s distinction belies its origins in the analysis of stronger Northern states capable of retaining, in their interaction with international institutions, a vision of interests separate from their actualization in these fora. Their approach, however, does provide the possibility

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23. As the country grows in international economic and security profile, the prospect of the defence of Brazilian commercial interests abroad through the Armed Forces is likely to arise as a hypothetical consideration—once which historical patterns dictate would be rapidly discarded.

24. 1996 National Defence Policy, paragraph 3.3.


27. See PARIS, “Global Culture”.
of pointing out the conflation of interests with values in the policy document, to
the detriment of the necessary clear definition of the former. While the policy
documents paint a clear picture of facets of Brazilian security identity, they do not
refine these aspects into pursuable interests or a sharp decisionmaking criterion.

The situation only improves slightly with the 2005 revision of the National
Defence Policy. The 2005 version makes the link between upholding the interna-
tional system, multilateral institutions and peace operations:

The prevalence of multilateralism and the invigoration of the principles consecrated
by international law as sovereignty, no-intervention and equality among States, are
the promoters of a more stable world, turned to the development and well being
of humanity.\textsuperscript{28}

Brazil acts in the international community respecting the constitutional principles
of self-determination, no-intervention and equality among States. In those condi-
tions, under the protection of multilateral organisms, the country participates in
peace operations, seeking to contribute to peace and international security.\textsuperscript{29}

(Prevention in the National Defence Policy is based on)

IV– [the] search for the peaceful solution to controversies;
V – [the] valorization of multilateral forums.\textsuperscript{30}

The 2005 document repeatedly highlights the importance of peace opera-
tions, without offering greater detail on their preparation or deployment, or a
criterion for commitment to either:

To enlarge the country’s projection in the world concert and to reaffirm its commit-
ment with the defense of peace and with the cooperation among the peoples, Brazil
should intensify its participation in humanitarian actions and in peace missions
with the support of multilateral organisms.\textsuperscript{31}

The importance of peace operations as a strategic objective, stated in the last
section of the 1996 document, is repeated unchanged nine years later.\textsuperscript{32} Once
more, the 2005 National Defence Policy does not offer a guideline as to how the
principles of Article IV of the Constitution are to be related to one another in
practice, and what are to be the fixed criteria, or even political parameters, for
the deployment of forces. The maintenance of multilateral structures and strong
participation in them are enshrined as the preferred way to make Brazilian inter-
ests heard at the international level, in such as way as to obviate the distinction

\textsuperscript{29} 2005 National Defence Policy, paragraph 4.12.
\textsuperscript{30} 2005 National Defence Policy, paragraph 6.2.
\textsuperscript{31} 2005 National Defence Policy, paragraph 6.17.
\textsuperscript{32} 2005 National Defence Policy, paragraph 7.25.
between March and Olsen’s two logics. Brazilian interests are defined in terms of a multilateralist, pacifist, sovereigntist identity, and peace operations subordinated to those interests.

This confusion stems in no small part from differences in the approaches taken by the different ministries involved in crafting the country’s security policy, particularly where peace operations are involved. Whereas the Ministry of External Relations is steeped in a “Grotian”33 culture of negotiation, multilateralism and pacifism, clearly aligned with a logic of appropriateness, the military-heavy Ministry of Defence tends to adopt a logic of consequences, assuming the pursuit of a rationally calculated national interest. This leads to a situation where military documents subordinate peacekeeping participation to consequence-based national interests, whose definition is given by the Foreign Ministry as a function of norms and identities aligned with notions of appropriate action. This is clearly consistent with Goldmann’s abovementioned critique concerned the logics’ ability to be cleanly separated. As a result, is a sense, evaluating the consequences of action is a practice already couched within perceptions of their appropriateness. To wit, the 2008 National Defence Strategy takes a step towards the operationalization of the concepts outlined in the interministerially negotiated Defence Policy, with a view to implications for the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence. Interestingly, it does so first by further enshrining elements of identity relevant to peace operations:

Brazil is pacific by tradition and conviction. It lives in peace with its neighbours. Its international relations are governed, among others, by the constitutional principles of non-intervention, the defence of peace and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This trait of pacifism is a part of national identity and a value to be conserved by the Brazilian people.34

Only later does the document revert, in the specific section on peace operations, to the need to subordinate actual deployment to notions of consequences and national interest: it sets as an objective

To promote the increase in training for the participation of the Armed Forces in peace operations, in UN forces or those of regional multilateral organizations.

1. Brazil should increase its participation in peace operations under the auspices of the UN or regional multilateral organizations, in accordance with national interests as expressed in international commitments.35

33. See, for example, Gustavo Sénéchal de GOFFREDO JÚNIOR, Entre poder e direito: A tradição grotiana na política externa brasileira. Brasilia: Instituto Rio Branco/FUNAG, 2005.
35. ibid., p. 62.
It is interesting to note the increasing importance given peace operations by the successive policy documents, without an attendant amelioration of content or level of executable detail. Though it devotes a separate heading to peace operations, the National Defence Strategy limits itself to repeating previous documents, adding the desire to assume a regional leadership role in training for such missions. Finally, the 2007 Military Defence Doctrine also highlights the importance of peace operations to the country’s foreign policy objectives, and once more attempts to create a hierarchy of national interests over multilateral participation: “the armed forces may participate in peace operations, in conformity with the prescriptions of the United Nations Charter, as long as the principles of non-intervention and the self-determination of peoples are respected.”

These documents illustrate the tensions inherent in laying out a policy based on the potentially conflicting principles outlined in the Constitution. The two main ministries involved can be said to take up sides within March and Olsen’s division between contending logics. As a result, there are clear tensions between the responses called for in the documents. For example, the country’s commitment to non-intervention – fostered most actively by the Foreign Ministry – by nature grants it a sceptical stance with regard to certain types of peace operations, particularly those deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The military document, on the other hand, argues strongly in favour of increasing overall participation across a range of mission types.

This raises the question of what interests are to be safeguarded through peacekeeping beyond of the declared (almost tautological) goal of further participation in international institutions. Of what is peacekeeping an example, in terms of national aims, other than improving the relationship with multilateral organizations and the international system? To date, the interpretation of these questions has tended to favour the line taken by the Foreign Ministry; nevertheless, there is necessity for a criterion to identify clearly which types of missions strike an acceptable balance between Constitutional objectives, and which form of participation can be routinely excluded. The delay in elaborating such a criterion is exacerbated by the fractured and underinstitutionalized nature of the political decisionmaking process.

4 THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF BRAZILIAN TROOPS TO PEACE OPERATIONS

Currently, the decisionmaking process for the deployment of peacekeeping troops in Brazil is ad-hoc and underinstitutionalised. As a result, it is quite malleable in that personalities play an excessive role in either speeding it up or holding it hostage. The legal basis for decisions is outdated, having been established as a temporary measure in 1956 with the country’s first participation in the United Nations Emergency Force in the Suez – 32 years before the ratification of the current Constitution. The lack of clear definition of formal pathways, or their complex and redundant nature when they are present, are not an uncommon feature in the Brazilian political process, and are in fact indicative of a frequent pattern of spontaneous solutions made permanent. From these origins, a fixed process has crystallized out of repeated practice.

The process begins when the United Nations, typically by way of DPKO, informsally requests the Permanent Mission of Brazil for a stance on a possible contribution of troops to an operation under planning. The Permanent Mission evaluates the request in light of the country’s interests at the United Nations and forwards it to the Ministry of External Relations. The MRE informally consults with the Defence Ministry (MD) on the availability of troops, and with the Presidency regarding the domestic political expediency of deployment. A formal request is sought from DPKO; the MRE and the MD respond in a Joint Statement of Motives (Exposição de Motivos Conjunta). Input is sought here as well from the Ministry of Planning and Budget, which must approve the stocking-up of the military budget for the operations. The process then moves to the Legislative Branch, by means of a Presidential Message to Congress containing the request and the Ministries’ evaluation. The Parliament then must approve the details of the deployment by means of a Decree under Law 2.593/1956.

Brazilian analysts have identified a series of difficulties with this process, among which one diplomat has identified the most problematic:

1. there is very low institutionality, given that the steps are not determined by a norm and might be circumvented or questioned. Further, the progress of the decision depends on the constant application of political pressures, above all on organs that are not directly involved in the topic (such as the Planning Ministry and the President’s Chief of Staff);

37. Note the prominence this accords both “interests” (consequences) and Itamaraty, whose preference is taken to be for appropriateness.
2. In this area there persists an acute dependency on personal relationships between the area officers for a request to be processed;

3. The Congress normally does not receive systematic information about the conflicts in questions and on peace operations and depends on news from the press;

4. As a result of the previous factors, it frequently happens that the decision is morose and ends up not meeting the expectations of the United Nations, which needs to mobilize contingents quickly.39

This makes the actual outcome of the process highly dependent upon politics and personality. Therefore, the overarching attitude of the government in power can leave a strong (occasionally party-political) mark on the country’s pattern of deployments to peace operations. Indeed, the country’s participation in MINUSTAH has very demonstrably shown this to be the case, in contrast to the pattern prior to the Haiti engagement.

5 HISTORICAL PATTERNS: BRAZIL AND PEACE OPERATIONS (1956-2004)

Prior to the country’s adoption of a leadership role in MINUSTAH, Brazil was a constant, yet small, contributor to peace operations. The country sent a steady stream of individual officers on UN PKOs as liaison officers, staff officers, and military observers. There were three exceptions to this rule, in the form of battalion-sized forces sent to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) I (1956-1967), the United Nations Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM) 1995-1997 and the UNOMOZ in Mozambique in 1993-1994, for which the country also briefly supplied the Force Commander.40 The country adhered very strictly to the norm of non-intervention, which was interpreted as prohibiting participation of missions under anything other than Chapter VI of the UN Charter, Chapter VII being seen as a violation of its Article 2(7).

The country took this stance so far as to abstain from voting on several resolutions on Haiti – and, tellingly, the decision to establish a more robust peace operation in Rwanda – during its stint as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 1994. With the exception of the early missions in the Suez Peninsula, which afforded the opportunity for a clearly neutral contribution to the maintenance of international order under the strictest of guidelines relative to the use of force, Brazilian peacekeeping contributions were subject to deployment in areas of clear national interest and affinity. Mozambique and Angola are former

39. UZIEL, pp. 81-82.

Portuguese colonies and members of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), which began to play an increasing role in Brazilian foreign policy at the time. In other terms, the deployments followed the logic of appropriateness, though not divorced from considerations of consequences, and these consequences were not filtered through a lens of increasing international profile (a national interest) through such participation.

Brazilian troops contributed largely in non-combat roles such as the provision of medical assistance, and their presence was not explicitly connected to declared broader foreign policy aims. This participation was to become much less reluctant as the country increasingly took on the characteristics of an emerging power, and began to undergo a series of shifts in the self-identification underlying its foreign policy, including its attitudes towards participation in peacekeeping.

6 NEW INTERESTS AND IDENTITY ARISE: BRAZIL AS AN EMERGING POWER
Brazil’s historical stance clearly reflects the country’s grounding in a specific Latin American regional security subculture that – in terms, for example, of the competing values enshrined in the Brazilian Constitution – values sovereignty and non-intervention over the (forceful) defence of peace and human rights. The advent of President Lula da Silva’s second term would lead to changes both in perceptions of Brazil’s international identity and in the nature of cost-benefit analysis associated with it.

The underinstitutionalised and personality-dependent decisionmaking process in fact facilitated a change in policymaking goals and their rapid implementation in practice. In terms of March and Olsen’s approach, a dual shift began to occur as a result of Brazil’s adopting a position typical of an emerging power: just as within the logic of appropriateness Brazil’s identity began to be redefined, away from a regionally anchored understanding towards that of a global player, the balance between the two logics began to shift as well, with more emphasis placed upon a cost-benefit analysis geared towards increasing the country’s global clout.

One way of encapsulating the internal tensions in Brazil’s policy towards intervention during this period is to frame them in terms of a clash between regional norms that have until recently been adequate to the country’s previous focus, and the attitudes inherent to the quest for greater influence at the


42. This section is closely based on the analysis in KENKEL, Kai Michael. Brazil and the Responsibility to Protect: Once Bitten, Twice Shy?, Paper prepared for presentation at the 52nd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 16-19 March 2011, Montréal, Québec, Canada.
international level. In realistic terms, the utility of peace operations as a means to attain more clout internationally derives strongly from the expressed availability to assume global responsibility signalled by participation in them. The succinct expression of this tension is that it relates to a shift in self-identification from a weak peripheral power (in need of the protection of ‘sovereignty as shield’) to a global stakeholder prepared to take responsibility for the international system and (particularly in the case of potential Council members) for those in it who cannot fend for themselves.

As a result, the balance between the Constitutional principles shifts away from those favoured in the regional context and towards those whose pursuit and support is seen as leading to a greater ultimate payoff at the international level. In the case of peace operations, this translates into a granting priority to the defence of human rights and of peace at the cost of (albeit the strictest form of) adherence to the principle of non-intervention.

One useful way of analysing emerging powers is to view them as a subclass of middle powers, harnessing the advances inherent to studies on that analytical category and highlighting differences between the traditional and the emerging middle powers. Here the author builds on a previous application of the emerging power concept to Brazilian policy regarding peace operations; the conclusions apply to the country’s stance on the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) as well. In line with March and Olsen’s analysis, and Paris’ conclusions, middle powers, as a result of their position in the international system, tend to pursue foreign policies that align with a logic of appropriateness as the most effective means of attaining objectives, with the attendant identity based on negotiation and compromise; strong support for international order, in the form of multilateral institutions; and “good international citizenship”. Middle powers self-identify with the status quo from which they benefit, and are often conservative supporters of the \textit{status quo ante} from which they profit.

States who emerged as middle powers after the end of the Cold War have a more ambiguous and often instrumental relationship with the international system. They are typically regional leaders who have sought to parlay their regional preponderance into increased global position. As Neack pointed out as early as 1995,
Non-Western middle powers or even ‘small’ or ‘weak’ powers may also support the status quo, even though the status quo is undeniably Western in origins. For these states, it is unrealistic to imagine completely revising the world system to better serve their interests. However, these states can attempt to find for themselves a position within the established order from which they can offer and defend non-status quo interests. India’s and Brazil’s involvement in the UN system can be understood in this way. Thus, participation in UN peace-keeping can derive from an interest in protecting the international system and the participant state’s current or desired position in that system.47

The abovementioned tension between the regional and global ambits is thus typical of these actors who are both central leaders and peripheral followers in the international system.48 Emerging powers have a more ambiguous relationship with international structures, supporting them when doing so is advantageous and seeking their reform or even obstruction when it is not.49 Thus an emerging power such as Brazil would be expected, within this form of analysis, to continue to support, at the very least rhetorically, international structures while seeking both a stronger role for itself within them, their overall reform in favour of a more advantageous outcome for the group of states it represents, and the prevention of developments counter to its own preferences.50 Overall, analysts have noted a more assertive stance in Brazil’s policy position in security matters51 and an increasing instrumentalization of peace operations towards objectives associated with the emerging power position.52

7 BRAZIL AS AN EMERGING POWER: MINUSTAH AS CRUCIBLE

Brazil’s contribution to MINUSTAH, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, represents a clear break from a series of previous policy principles related to intervention. Though the Foreign Ministry is correct in insisting that greater involvement in MINUSTAH is an expression of continuity in the country’s commitment to international institutions,53 the nature of the change (principally to

47. NEACK, p. 184.
50. As evidenced in the recent Western intervention in Libya and Brazil’s abstention during the Security Council vote authorizing the use of force.
a mission which, despite semantic sophistry, undeniably belongs in the Chapter VII category) belies fundamental changes in both the way the country sees its identity, and in the cost-benefit analysis that underlies how it defines its interests. The change is, in essence, a shift from a regionally-bound mode of conduct to one geared to growth toward filling global objectives.

In terms of the identity-based logic, Brazil no longer sees itself merely as the lead power in a particular (relatively peripheral) region of the world, but as a global player in its own right. As a result of its strong commitment to the United Nations and other multilateral institutions, there has been a realization that such a shift comes with a change in the costs and benefits of action. In important ways, in particular the Latin American interpretation of sovereignty and the ensuing response to changes in international norms such as the “responsibility to protect” have been a handicap in New York, as in the eyes of several countries key to an eventual reform of the UNSC, it clouds the country’s ability to project readiness to take on increased international responsibility. Indeed President Lula da Silva has recognized this as a motive for the country’s role in MINUSTAH: “This is how we responded, Brazil and other Latin American countries, to the call from the UN to contribute to the stabilization of Haiti. Whoever defends new paradigms in international relations cannot be absent from a concrete situation.”

This realization was to have certain effects on the logic of consequences and its cost-benefit analysis. Despite well-known misgivings about deserting an absolutist interpretation of sovereignty for a more participative stance on humanitarian intervention, Lula’s Foreign Minister Celso Amorim also realized that the emerging power’s desire for global clout came with a steeper price tag:

Our participation in the UN mission in Haiti also arises from the principle that peace is not a free international good: the maintenance of peace has a price. That price is participation. To be absent from or to evade giving an opinion or to act in a crisis situation can signify exclusion from the decisionmaking process or worse, dependency in relations to other states or regions.

In this sense, the basic metrics of the logic of consequences have changed: there is now a greater cost to non-intervention, and its perceived peace-bringing benefits are not valued in the same way at the global level (where the protection of

54. On this point, see FONTOURA, esp. p. 261. Brazil has a longstanding, if not extensive, tradition of participation in peacekeeping operations. With the exception of battalion-size commitments in the Suez, Angola and Mozambique (and now the country’s leadership role in MINUSTAH), the pattern has been of contributing individuals or small groups as observers.
55. See KENKEL, Once bitten.
56. CANINAS, p. 15.
human rights are increasingly paramount) as they were historically in the region. There is a growing though reluctant realization that with power comes responsibility, and that if peace operations are to be a key vehicle for these aims, these may not be attainable without more robust participation in peace operations. This is combined with a shift in self-identification, as described above, that has led to the expected shift towards a middle power’s more ambiguous and instrumental stance towards multilateral engagement. The bulk of diplomatic response to Northern states’ equation of responsibility with the readiness to use force has been to seek to demonstrate that responsibility can be exercised without recourse to force through a focus on development and the export of social policies that have met with success at home.

8 LESSONS FROM THE FIELD: MOTIVATIONS AND RESULTS

It is therefore paramount to note that the availability of military force is not the most important element of the country’s effort in Haiti. Alongside sending the largest contingent to MINUSTAH, as well as – in a break with normal UN practice – consistently providing its Force Commander – in parallel with its military contribution Brazil is engaged in a highly successful and targeted attempt to develop a specifically Brazilian, Southern, form of peacebuilding as a counterproposal to the liberal-democratic Northern model that pervades the UN approach today. In addition, Brazil has taken on a leadership role in coordinating the efforts of South American contributors to the missions, who make up slightly over half of its composition. Participation in peace operations has undeniably become the nucleus of a crucial part of the country’s projected identity, and a prominent way for it to stake its claim to greater participation and to regional and bloc leadership.

In practice, as a number of previous analyses show, there is a clear idea in the field as to what Brazilian priorities are in peace operations, how they fit into a larger plan for maximizing Brazil’s international profile, and how they can be employed as a tool both in pursuit of national interests and the realization of the precepts of Brazilian identity. It is within the context of the “Haitian laboratory” that a model has emerged that has gone far further than the political process in transforming into concrete actions the precepts set out in both Brazilian declaratory policy documents and in its long-standing foreign policy traditions.

58. For much more detail on this point see Kenkel, “Emerging Power”.
This model couples the Brazilian penchant for negotiation and peaceful conflict resolution with the country’s traditional focus both internally and in foreign policy on sustainable economic development. Though there is emphasis on negotiation and pacific means – bolstered by an approach that places an incentive on close contact with the local population – Brazilian troops have not shied away from using force effectively and very robustly when called upon to do so – although this came as the result of considerable pressure from other states present in the Haitian context. In development terms, there is a preference – somewhat distinct from that of other “emerging donors” – on smaller-scale integrated projects rather than major infrastructure projects.

A further forte of the burgeoning Brazilian model is the export of technologies and techniques used in the country’s own domestic context in situations of underdevelopment and violence. This is embodied chiefly in the activities of the agricultural development agency EMBRAPA and the microlevel community violence reduction projects of the NGO Viva Rio, which receives its funding from Canadian, Norwegian and Brazilian sources. Taken holistically, this approach represents a distinct Brazilian contribution to the development of peacebuilding paradigms, and as such constitutes a diplomatic “niche” of great utility to Brazil in advancing its foreign policy goals through participation in peace operations and broader peacebuilding efforts.

What, then, are Brazil’s objectives and motivations to participate in peace operations? Peace operations allow Brazil to attain a specific set of objectives which bridge the logics of consequences and appropriateness, and the rationales of material interest as well as normative identity. Indeed, though the focus here is on the precepts of foreign policy, the benefits of PKO participation are not limited to diplomatic objectives and include the training and equipment of the Armed Forces, as well as the provision for the military of a new, prestigious mission intimately tied to the country’s image abroad. One Brazilian diplomat has reduced Brazilian interests to the following useful chart.

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60. See COOPER.
61. Information obtained in interviews with actors involved in implementing the model in Haiti, 2009 and 2011.
63. For more details see LIRA GOÉS and OLIVEIRA JÚNIOR; ALSINA, and the extensive body of work of Antonio Jorge RAMALHO DA ROCHA.
64. UZIEL, p. 91.
CHART 1

**Internal, bilateral/regional and institutional interests**

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<th>Internal</th>
<th>Bilateral/regional</th>
<th>Institutional</th>
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<tr>
<td>- achieve principles in Article 4 of Constitution;</td>
<td>- show solidarity with the conflict-stricken country;</td>
<td>- legitimate candidacy for a permanent seat on the UNSC;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- training for the Armed Forces;</td>
<td>- deepen relationship with host country or neighbours;</td>
<td>- strengthen multilateralism and the peaceful resolution of conflicts;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- promote the role of the military in society.</td>
<td>- deepen relations with other TCCs;</td>
<td>- maximize influence in UNSC during elected periods;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- promote Brazilian trade and investments.</td>
<td>- demonstrate capacity for mobilization.</td>
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Participation in peace operations allows Brazil to satisfy the logic of appropriateness by conducting itself in a manner that is plainly supportive of the United Nations as an institution, specifically with regard to strengthening its mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. As such it is an excellent vehicle for the transformation of the country’s Grotian stance into concrete action. Sending blue helmets concomitantly fulfils the logic of consequences as well, not only bringing the benefits of demonstrating the country’s fitness and willingness to assume international responsibility (and thus its aptness for a veto-endowed seat on the Security Council), but it hedges against the cost of losing influence by not engaging actively in fora where the major powers are active.65

This latter calculus, however, is contingent upon engaging in peace operations in a form perceived as demonstrating more international responsibility by those same major powers. In this sense, the Brazilian peacebuilding model serves a broader purpose. As intervention norms move towards underpinning an increased willingness on the part of major powers to use force to protect civilians’ human rights, it serves as a way for Brazil to demonstrate responsibility and effectiveness without recourse to increased levels of force. In this sense, an important element of future Brazilian peacekeeping policy centres around the exportability of the model beyond Haiti to contexts in which the Council deems it useful. This specialization on certain development-related aspects of the peacebuilding process dovetails nicely with the division of labour in PKOs propounded, *inter alia*, in DPKO’s *New Horizon* Report.66 In short, the ensemble of opportunities presented by the Haitian experience serve to show the way for the broader transformation of notoriously vague policy objectives into concrete actions that both advance Brazilian interests and serve to consolidate its international identity.

65. LIRA GOÉS and OLIVEIRA JÚNIOR, p. 424.
9 ATTAINABLE GOALS AND NECESSARY REFORMS

The attainment of these objectives, however, requires a set of clear reforms. First, a new generation of Brazilian analysts have pointed out the dire need for systematization and automatization of the decision-making process, which is seen as generating inconsistent results that might jeopardize the functioning of a consolidated agenda in the area of peace operations:

Some might say that this is indeed a deliberate strategy and that participating in UN peacekeeping operations on a case-by-case basis is indeed in Brazil’s national interest. However, this interpretation is misleading. In fact, as noted by Diniz …, the Brazilian bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC, for instance, was threatened by the country’s scarce participation in UN peace operations and hence Brazil had to accept the call to join MINUSTAH. Considering this reasoning, and bearing in mind the current status of an emerging power that has recently been attributed to Brazil (see, e.g., Burges, 2008), it seems likely that the maintenance of such inconsistent positions in the realm of international security may have a negative impact on Brazil’s ‘emergence’.  

Among the various factors in need of clarification and reform on the internal side of Brazilian engagement with peace operations, three in particular come to mind as most urgent. The first is the development of a clear decisionmaking criterion for participation in peace operations and other military interventions, which enumerates definitively how to balance historical positions and constitutional principles in given situations. This criterion must explain consistently why, for example, a mission under Chapter VI is acceptable and one under Chapter VII is not, and under what specific circumstances a mission under Chapter VII, or with peace enforcement characteristics such as MINUSTAH, might be contemplated. Ideally this norm would be enshrined in a legal decree to be applied consistently throughout the decisionmaking process. Such a criterion is not a new phenomenon internationally, having been installed in a number of countries where contributions to peace operations are controversial, such as Germany and the United States.

Second, the decisionmaking process itself should be streamlined and formalized in order to reduce dependence on personalities, increase both parliamentary and popular participation, and remove spaces for the abuse of the issue at hand through political or bureaucratic manoeuvring. This too should be subject to a legal decree establishing clearly the relationship between the competencies of each Ministry and particularly those of the Parliament, which continues to be beset by a lack of interest and competence in matters related to security policy.

67. CAVALCANTE, p. 155.
Thirdly and finally, at the basis of the elaboration of the criteria and objectives for Brazilian participation in peace operations must lie the clear elucidation of the motives for contribution, along the lines of both logics espoused by March and Olsen: the logic of appropriateness and identity favoured by the MRE and the logic of consequences and rational interest espoused by Defence. Beyond the role of these two Ministries in the process, the country would benefit immeasurably from a broad process of public involvement and debate, including scholars, journalists and the informed public, much along the lines of the Peacebuilding Consultations held in Canada. The natural timeline for such a process to culminate is in the formulation of the country’s first Defence White Paper, scheduled to begin later in 2011.

Indeed the coming White Paper represents an inestimably crucial opportunity to systematize the country’s approach to peace operations – an absolute prerequisite for the use of participation to further its foreign policy aims, especially with a view to demonstrating aptitude for a Security Council seat. If Brazil succeeds in professionalizing the political side of how it deals with its role in peace operations the same way it has created a successful paradigm through rooted practice at the operational level, not only will the country benefit in the pursuit of its larger aims for more stake in global affairs, but the field of intervention and conflict resolution will reap the benefits of the rise of an engaged, innovative and powerful partner in the global South.

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